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IV,
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal under Utah Code Ann, S 78-2a-2(k) . The judgment was entered
on July 29, 1993. Chanhmany*s motion for a new trial was filed on
July 30, 1993 and denied on November 1, 1993. She filed her Notice
of Appeal on November 26, 1993.

On January 24, 1994, the Utah

Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
V.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Should this Court uphold a jury award of special

damages in an amount for less than that established by the uncontroverted evidence?
2.

Did the lower court err in denying Chanhmany a new

trial or additur when the jury awarded less than the amount established by uncontradicted evidence for necessary medical expenses?
3.

Is Chanhmany entitled to a general damage award if

there is uncontested evidence to support a special damage award
exceeding $3,000 in medical expenses, but the jury chooses to award
a lesser amount?
4.

Was the jury influenced by passion or prejudice?

5.

Can a trial court strike a general damages award if

there is uncontradicted

evidence of permanent disability and

impairment, and the Court does not present the issue to the jury?
1

6.

Did the lower court deny Chanhmany her right to a

jury trial when it concluded Chanhmany was permanently disabled so
it did not present the issue to the jury, but subsequently struck
the general damages award which requires a conclusion that Chanhmany was not permanently disabled?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard of Review for a decision denying a motion
for a new trial based on Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5)
and/or (6) was articulated in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). It is the responsibility of the trial
court to review the amount of the award to insure the jury has
acted within its proper bounds.
conclude

that

there was

If the trial court can reasonably

insufficient

evidence

to

justify

the

verdict or that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, or that the jury acted with passion or prejudice, it may
grant the motion and order a new trial.

Crookston, supra at 804.

In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision denying a new trial, the
appellate court reverses if there is no reasonable basis for the
lower court's decision.

Crookston, supra at 805.

Issues (3) and (5) require an interpretation of Utah Code
Ann.

§ 31A-22-309.

Thereafter they are questions of

law and

reviewed with no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial
court.

See e.g., Matter of Estate of Anderson, 821 P.2d 1169, 1171

(Utah 1991); Ward v. Richfield Citv, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990);
2

Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City Corp, 828 P. 2d 1071, 1072 (Utah App.
1992) .
The issue of whether an appellant has been denied the
right to a jury trial guaranteed by Utah Const, art. I, § 10 is
also a question of law.

See. International Harvester Credit Corp.

v. Pioneer Tractor and Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418 (Utah 1981).
VI.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
The determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
ordinances are:
Utah Const, art. I, § 10;
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307;
Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-309;
H.B. 15 (passed 2/4/94);
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(5) and (6).
Copies are set forth in the addendum to this brief.
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on a jury

verdict in the Third Judicial District Court and a subsequent order
denying Chanhmany's Motion for an Additur and/or a New Trial.

3

B.

Course of Proceedings.
This is an automobile accident case.

The jury awarded

$3,000 in general damages. The jury also awarded $2,100 in special
damages as compensation for medical expenses even though the
uncontradicted evidence established medical expenses of at least
$3,299.09.

Although the Court asked the jury to award damages to

Chanhmany for her medical expenses, it did not ask the jury to
determine whether Chanhmany met the threshold requirements of Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) (e).
jury

to

decide

whether

Moreover, the Court did not ask the

Chanhmany

was

permanently

disabled.

Subsequently, the lower court denied Chanhmany's Motion for an
Additur or Alternatively a New Trial.

The Court also struck the

jury's $3,000 general damage award. Chanhmany timely appealed the
judgment and subsequent Order of the lower court.
C.

Statement of the Facts.
Chanhmany is a young Laotian woman injured in an auto-

mobile accident on July 22, 1989. (R. 2-8).
history

of

neck,

shoulder

or

back

pain.

She had no prior
(Transcript

of

Proceedings, April 27-29, 1993, pp. 72, 76, 135 [hereinafter "Tr.
p.

"])•

She was lawfully stopped at a red light near the

intersection of 3300 South and 300 East when struck by a car driven
by Brian Bone.

(Tr. pp. 65-67) . Bone was involved in an immediate

prior collision with a car driven by Joyce Preston. (R. 2-8; Tr.

4

pp. 66, 67, 309-311, 314; Tr. Exs. P-10, P-ll).

A diagram

illustrating the accident is set forth below:
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Immediately after the accident, she was transported by
ambulance to Holy Cross Hospital for treatment.

At the hospital,

Chanhmany complained of neck pain. (Tr. p. 154; Tr. Ex. D-15) . The
hospital x-rayed her back, neck and shoulder. (Tr. p. 70; Tr. Ex.
D-15).

The hospital also gave her a neck brace. (Tr. p. 70).
For two to four days, her neck, shoulder and back hurt.

(Tr. p. 71) . Her "foster mother" took her to see Dr. Gary Whitley,
a chiropractor. (Tr. p. 71). She complained of pain in her neck,
shoulder and lower back. (Tr. p. 72) .
July 26, 1989 to February of 1991.

Whitley treated her from

Chanhmany ceased treatment

because she could not compensate Whitley.

(Tr. p. 355).

Whitley

heat,

treated

Chanhmany's

injuries with

Dr.

soft tissue

massage, spinal manipulations, ultrasound, electrical stimulation,
a neck brace and back brace. (Tr. pp. 71, 129, 130).
testified

that

the

treatments

were

helpful.

Chanhmany

(Tr. p. 72).

Chanhmany was also examined by an orthopedic specialist at FHP, and
on his recommendation received physical therapy at FHP.

(Tr. pp.

74, 75, 99-100; Trial Ex. P-3).
As a result of the accident, Chanhmany1s truck was
heavily damaged.

She received $1,680 for repairs.

(Tr. p. 69).

In addition, she missed five (5) days of vacation and at least two
(2) days of work. (Tr. pp. 80, 81, 242-243, 259; Trial Ex. P-22).
Chanhmany's neck pain ended after treatment.

However,

she still experiences sharp back pain 3-4 times a week, numbness in

6

her shoulder, and she occasionally wears the back brace. (Tr. pp.
74, 75, 78).
Chanhmany has trouble lifting things at work.
workers must help her lift 50 lb. boxes.

Her co-

(Tr. pp. 76, 77, 260).

She also has difficulty lifting laundry and groceries. (Tr. pp. 73,
77).

She can no longer participate in sports. (Tr. p. 79).

Exercises are difficult; she cannot do sit ups.

(Tr. p. 78). Her

neck, shoulder and back range of motions are restricted. (Tr. pp.
148, 149).
Chanhmany sued both Bone and Preston. (R. 2-8) .

She

claimed that one or both of them was 100 percent at fault for the
collision since Chanhmany's car was struck while lawfully stopped
for the light. (Id,.) At trial two of the jurors expressed a bias
against chiropractors.
THE COURT:

Do any of you oppose going to a
chiropractor for treatment, have any
strong feelings about going to — .
We have two. We have the medical
student, Mr. Stahe1i.

MR. STAHELI:

I think they have their place and it
depends on what the problem is.

THE COURT:

Mr. Staheli, would the fact that
you're a medical student, could you
sit here and be fair and impartial
and listen to the evidence and make
your decision accordingly?

MR. STAHELI:

I think so.

7

THE COURT:

You have to answer yes or no.

MR. STAHELI:

I will be fair and impartial here.
* * *

MR. NORTSTROM: In answer to your question, would I
go
to
a
chiropractor,
no,
I
wouldn't, but that wouldn't affect
me.
(Tr. pp. 41, Ins. 24-25; 42, Ins. 1-3, 16-23; 43, Ins. 23-25).
At the trial, there was no dispute over whether Chanhmany
was negligent.
not negligent

The Court entered a directed verdict that she was
and so instructed the jury.

(Tr. p. 331, Jury

Instruction 22, R. 293-338).
In addition, although there was a dispute over whether
Chanhmany

should be compensated

for every cent of her medical

expenses (Tr. pp. 382, 383), there was no dispute that Chanhmany
sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses.

The defendants

stipulated to the admission of Trial Exhibit P.-3, Chanhmany's
medical

bills.

(Tr. pp.

278,

279).

The

exhibit

shows

that

Chanhmany sustained the following medical expenses:
Gold Cross Ambulance
Holy Cross Hospital
Emergency Room Care
FHP
Dr. Gary Whitley (Chiropractor)
TOTAL

$

158.09
256.00
469.00
2.416.00
$3,299.09

No witness testified that the expenses were unnecessary
or did not meet the study authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22307(2).

Similarly, no party disputed the medical expenses by
8

requesting a medical panel as set forth in Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22307(2)(e).
Because the parties did not dispute that Chanhmany
sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses, the jury was not
asked to find whether Chanhmany met the threshold requirements of
Utah Code Ann, § 31A-22-309(1)(e)• Nor were they instructed that
Chanhmany could not maintain a cause of action unless she sustained
more than $3,000 in medical expenses.
determine how much Chanhmany

should

The jury was asked only to
receive for her medical

expenses and general damages as reasonable compensation. (R. 293338, Instruction Nos. 21, 29; Special Verdict R. 342-343).
There also was no dispute that Chanhmany was permanently
disabled — only how much. Chanhmanyfs treating chiropractor, Gary
Whitley, gave her a "whole person" impairment rating of twelve
(12%) percent.

(Tr. pp. 147-150). The defendant's medical expert,

Dr. Gerald R. Morress gave her a rating of 6.8% (Tr. p. 220, 229,
230) .

A permanent impairment means that the accident victim is

disabled.

Dr. Whitley explained:
Impairment is a physical loss of function....
* * *

A disability is a rating that they're given
according to whether they can continue
functioning in their normal environment, their
job, their home, their regular activities....
* * *

You need to have an impairment in order to
determine what a disability might be.
9

* * *

That means [Chanhmany•s] 12% impaired for the
whole function of the whole body for that
particular
injury a permanent kind of
impairment.
(Tr. pp. Ill, Ins. 12, 15-20, 23-24, 150, Ins. 7-9).
Based on the unanimous medical opinions, received by the
Court, the trial judge concluded that Chanhmany was disabled and
entitled to some compensation:
THE COURT:

It has been established by both doctors
that there's an injury, and what more do
you have to tell that jury if she
sustained an injury that may be compensable?
They both assigned a rate of
disability.
One is 5 percent and the
other is 12 percent. That jury is going
to make its determination between five
percent and twelve percent, how much
should she receive.

(Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10).
* * *

Either they believe Dr. Whitley that she
has a 12 percent or they believe Dr.
Morress that she has 5 percent.
(Tr. p. 270, Ins. 16-19).
Because the trial judge concluded that Chanhmany was not
permanently disabled, the jury was not asked to find whether
Chanhmany was permanently disabled and was not instructed that
Chanhmany could not maintain a cause of action if she was not
permanently disabled. (R. 293-338, Jury Instructions). Disability
simply was not an issue.
10

The jury attributed 100 percent of the accident fault to
Bone, but only awarded Chanhmany $2,100 in special damages as
compensation

for

her

medical

damages. (R. 342-343).

expenses

and

$3,000

in

general

Chanhmany objected to the proposed verdict

on the grounds that Chanhmany was permanently disabled so she met
the statutory threshold requirements.
Chanhmany
alternative,

for

also
an

moved

additur

for
on

(R. 371-72; 375-78).
a

the

new

trial

grounds

that

or

in
the

the
jury

disregarded the uncontroverted evidence and the verdict resulted
from passion or prejudice.

(R. 396-405).

The lower court denied Chanhmany's motions and granted
Bone's motion to strike the general damage award. (R. 426-427).
Chanhmany timely appealed. (R. 428-429).
VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
CHANHMANY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE
INADEQUATE AWARD FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES IS MORE THAN
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. IT IS
AGAINST ALL OF THE UNCONTROVERTED TRIAL EVIDENCE.
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S DECI8ION DENYING THE
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS UNREASONABLE
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

31A-22-309 (1) (e) provides

that

an

injured auto accident victim may maintain a cause of action if the
person sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses. The parties
stipulated to the admission of Exhibit P-3, Chanhmany1s medical
11

expenses.

No witness

challenged

treatment provided to Chanhmany.

the expenses or the medical
No disciplined review of the

evidence justifies an award of less than $3,999. Thus, a new trial
should be ordered or an additur imposed.

John Call Engineering,

Inc. v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1990).
POINT II
THE JURY'8 INADEQUATE DAMAGE AWARD AS COMPENSATION
FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES DOES NOT WARRANT
THE STRIKING OF THE GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

31A-22-309 (e) does

not

explicitly

require a jury to award reasonable compensation in excess of $3,000
for medical expenses.

It only requires the car accident victim

sustain more than $3,000 in medical expenses. Thus, the jury was
not asked to rule whether Chanhmany met the statutory threshold.
There was no need to because there was no dispute.

The parties did

not avail themselves of the procedures provided in Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-22-307.

In summary, while people may differ as to how much

Chanhmany should be compensated for medical expenses, there is no
dispute that Chanhmany received the medical treatment and incurred
the expenses.

Thus, the lower court erred in striking the general

damages' award.
POINT III
CHANHMANY 18 ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THERE IS NO
FACTUAL DISPUTE THAT CHANHMANY WAS PERMANENTLY DISABLED
All the medical testimony showed that Chanhmany has been
permanently impaired 6.8 percent to 12 percent.
12

If a person is

permanently impaired, he or she is permanently disabled.

(Tr. p.

Ill) ; see H.B. 15 (passed 2/4/94). The lower court judge concluded
that
Chanhmany was disabled.

(Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10).

Since there is

no dispute that Chanhmany is disabled, the general damage award
should not have been stricken.
POINT IV
THE JURY'S INADEQUATE AWARD FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES
RESULTS FROM PREJUDICE
The in court remarks of two jurors and the inadequate
compensatory award for Chanhmany1s medical expenses show that the
jury's verdict is a product of prejudice. Thus, the lower court's
denial of Chanhmany's motion for a new trial was without a
reasonable basis.

This Court should remand the case for a new

trial.
POINT V
THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT CHANHMANY WAS
DISABLED COUPLED WITH THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE
DISABILITY ISSUE TO THE JURY AND SUBSEQUENT DENIAL
OF CHANHMANY'8 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL EFFECTIVELY
DENIED CHANHMANY HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON
THIS IMPORTANT FACTUAL ISSUE
In this case, all of the medical testimony shows that
there was not a dispute over whether Chanhmany was permanently
disabled. Rather, there was only a dispute as to the extent of the
permanent disability.

Thus, the lower court concluded that

Chanhmany was permanently disabled and entitled to compensation.
13

(Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10).

However, when the jury awarded less than

$3,000 for compensation for medical expenses, the Court struck the
general damages award.

To do that, it had to conclude that

Chanhmany was not permanently disabled. However, whether Chanhmany
was permanently disabled, was a question of fact. Chanhmany's right
to a jury trial on this important issue was denied.
IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CHANHMANY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE
INADEQUATE AWARD FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES IS MORE THAN
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. IT IS
AGAINST ALL OF THE UNCONTROVERTED TRIAL EVIDENCE.
THEREFORE. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DENYING THE
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS UNREASONABLE
A.

Factual Background —

Marshalling of the Evidence.

All the uncontroverted trial evidence established that
Chanhmany incurred more than $3,000 in medical expenses as a result
of the accident.

At trial, the parties stipulated to admission of

Exhibit P-3. (Tr. pp. 277, 289).
medical bills.

The exhibit is a copy of the

They show that Chanhmany incurred the following

medical expenses:
Gold Cross Ambulance
Holy Cross Hospital
Emergency Room Care
FHP
Dr. Gary Whitley (Chiropractor)
TOTAL

$

158.09
256.00
469.00
2.416.00
$3,299.09
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There are not any contrary exhibits.

Moreover, not one witness

testified that the foregoing expenses were not medical expenses or
said that the expenses were not incurred as a result of the
accident.
At the trial, only three witnesses testified on the
subject of medical expenses: Chanhmany, Dr. Gary Whitley, and Dr.
Gerald R. Morress. A summary of each witnesses testimony follows:
CHANHMANY:

Chanhmany, the accident victim, testified

that an

ambulance took her to Holy Cross Hospital.
hospital

Chanhmany

received

At the

medical

treatment

including x-rays and a neck collar.

She also

received treatment from Dr. Whitley. The treatment
consisted of soft tissue massage, spinal adjustments, and ultrasound treatments. In addition, she
wore a neck brace and back brace provided by Dr.
Whitley.

She testified that Dr. Whitley's treat-

ment helped.

(Tr. pp. 69-70, 71-72).

In addition,

she testified that she received treatment by Dr.
Penny at FHP, and obtained physical therapy. (Tr.
pp. 74, 75, 99, 100).
DR. WHITLEY:

Whitley

testified

that

Chanhmany

received

the

normal treatment for accident injury victims. (Tr.
p. 131, Ins. 16-25; 132, Ins. 1-21).
DR. MORRESS:

Dr. Morress, a neurologist retained by the defendant, did not criticize the medical expenses or the
15

medical treatment provided by Chanhmany's health
care providers.

His testimony was

limited to

describing the treatment provided by Dr. Penny and
a comment that Dr. Whitley treated Chanhmany for
the period indicated in her medical records for
what Whitley, felt was the appropriate treatment.
(Tr. pp. 199-200; 202, Ins. 3-11).
B.

Legal Analysis.
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) provides that an injured

car accident victim may maintain a cause of action if "the person
has sustained . . . (e) medical expenses to a person in excess of
$3,000.00." In this case, the medical expenses totalled $3,299.00.
As shown in part "A" above, reasonable minds can only
come to one conclusion, Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in
medical expenses.

There is no dispute that as a result of the

accident, Chanhmany received medical treatment and incurred the
medical expenses.
When a jury, as in this case, fails to take into account,
proven facts and awards inadequate damages, the remedies are to
either award a new trial or grant an additur. As explained in Paul
v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 3, 261 P.2d 670 (1953):
If inadequacy . . . of the verdict presents a
situation that such inadequacy . . . shows a
disregard by the jury of the evidence . . .
then the court may . . . grant a new trial.
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See also Wellman v, Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1969). Or
the court may grant an additur to the verdict.

See Bodon v.

Suhrmann. 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826, 828 (1958).
Similarly on appeal, the lower court's failure to grant
a new trial or an additur is remedied by either ordering a new
trial or by remanding with instructions to enter a judgment in the
amount justified by the evidence.

In John Call Engineering. Inc.

v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1990), an engineering firm
appealed a $13,440 jury verdict and claimed that the verdict was
too low.

As in this case, the plaintiff moved for a new trial

and/or requested additional damages both of which were rejected.
The

Court

of

Appeals

examined

the

evidence

of

damages and

concluded:
While plausible views of the evidence might
have led to fixing a damage award at certain
other levels within this broad range, no
evidence of record, nor any disciplined view
of the evidence of record would support an
award outside this range. . . .
On appeal,
although it [Call] would settle for a new
trial, Call principally argues the court
erred, given the lack of any contrary evidence
in not directing a verdict or judgment in this
minimal amount and that we should remand with
instructions to do so.
* * *

In this case, while reasonable minds could
differ on whether Call was entitled to more,
the evidence established it was clearly
entitled to judgment in at least the amount of
$56,377.60. . . . Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment which was entered on the jury's
verdict and remand with instructions to enter
17

judgment
in
$56,377.60.

the

principal

amount

of

John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 683 (Utah
App. 1990).
As in Call, there is no record evidence showing that
Chanhmany's medical expenses were less than $3,299. Moreover, any
disciplined view of the evidence supports an award of medical
expenses

for

Chanhmany

$3,299.

Thus,

this

Court

a new trial or remand with

should

either

grant

instructions to enter a

judgment in the amount of $3,299 for medical expenses, and to
reinstate the general damage award.
POINT II
THE JURY'S INADEQUATE DAMAGE AWARD AS COMPENSATION
FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES DOES NOT WARRANT
THE STRIKING OF THE GENERAL DAMAGES AWARD
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1)(e) only requires that a
car accident victim sustain medical damages in excess of $3,000 in
order to maintain a cause of action.
award

compensatory

damages

It does not require a jury to

for medical

expenses

in excess of

$3,000.

Nor does it explicitly state how to resolve disputes over

whether

a

victim

has

sustained

more

than

$3,000

in

medical

expenses. However, section 3 07 has some suggestions. This section
of the Utah no-fault law, is designed so that the statute will
apply with an even-handed manner.

See R. E. Keaton, Compensatory

Systems and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 Utah L.Rev. 383, 391.
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Specifically, Utah Code Ann, § 31-22-307 provides that in
a disputed case, the parties can refer to the study authorized by
subsection (2) . Or, the Court on its own motion, or on the motion
of either party may designate an impartial medical panel of not
more than three licensed physicians to examine the claimant and
testify before the Court.

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(2)(d).

The fact that neither of the parties nor the Court used
the study nor the panel shows that there was never a dispute that
Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses.

More-

over, even if there was a dispute, the jury was not asked to
resolve it.

It was not asked to determine whether Chanhmany met

the threshold requirements of Section 309. All it was asked to do,
was to determine reasonable compensatory
expenses (R. 342-343).

damages for medical

As such, the award in and of itself, does

not show that Chanhmany did not sustain more than $3,000 in medical
expenses.

Thus, the Court's reliance on the special verdict, to

find that Chanhmany did not meet the threshold requirements (R.
392-395) was misplaced.

19

POINT III
CHANHMANY IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THERE IS NO
FACTUAL DISPUTE THAT CHANHMANY WAS PERMANENTLY DISABLED
A.

Factual Background — Marshalling of the Evidence.
Chanhmany is permanently disabled.

testimony.

She said so in her

All the medical experts agreed that she was disabled

and so did the trial judge.
Chanhmany testified that she still has sharp pains in her
lower back and numbness in her shoulder. The pain and numbness are
substantiated by her medical records.
P-19, P-20).

(Tr. pp. 73-74; Trial Ex.

She cannot lift the 50 lb. boxes without help from

her co-workers.

(Tr. pp. 76, 77, 90-91, 260).

She has trouble

lifting the laundry or the groceries. (Tr. p. 77). She cannot do
sit ups.

(Tr. p. 78). She no longer participates in sports. (Tr.

p. 79).
Dr. Gerald R. Morress, the defendant's medical expert,
performed an Independent Medical Examination (IME).

Based on his

IME and Chanhmany's medical records, he gave Chanhmany a 6.8% whole
person permanent impairment rating. He determined that Chanhmany's
back pain and numbness in her shoulder equal a 6.8% permanent
impairment rating under the guidelines promulgated by the American
Medical Association (AMA).
Dr.

Whitley,

(Tr. p. 220, 230).
the

treating

chiropractor,

treated

Chanhmany, and applied the same AMA guidelines to conclude that
Chanhmany had a 12% permanent impairment rating or disability. (Tr.
20

pp. 147-150) . He concluded that in addition to the lower back pain
and numbness in her shoulder, Chanhmany1s neck, shoulder and back
range of motions were all impaired. (Tr. pp. 149-150).

If a person

has a permanent impairment rating, he is by definition disabled.
Dr. Whitley so testified:
Impairment is a physical loss of function....
A disability is rating that they're given
according to whether they continue functioning
in their normal environment, their job, their
home, their regular activities.
* * *

You need to have an impairment in order to
determine what a disability might be.
(Tr. p. Ill, Ins. 12-18, 23-24).
From the foregoing evidence and testimony, the trial
court judge concluded that Chanhmany was permanently disabled and
entitled to some compensation:
THE COURT:

It has been established by both doctors
that there is an injury and what more do
you have to tell that jury if she sustained an injury that may be compensable?
They both assigned a rate of disability.
One is 5 percent and the other is 12
percent. That jury is going to make its
determination between five percent and
twelve percent.
How much she should
receive.

(Tr. p. 269, Ins. 2-10).
Thus, the lower court did not instruct the jury on
Section 31-22-309(1)(c). Nor did it submit the disability issue to
the jury.

There was no need.

All the witnesses testified on the
21

subject agreed that she was disabled and the trial court judge
concluded that she was disabled. . • until the jury returned an
award of $2,100 for medical expenses.
strike the general damages awarded.

The defendants moved to

Chanhmany pointed out that the

damage award should stand because there was no factual dispute that
Chanhmany was permanently disabled and sustained more than $3,000
in medical expenses.

(R. 371-372, 375-378, 398-405).

The trial

court, however, struck the general damages award and by necessity
concluded that contrary to all of the evidence marshalled above,
Chanhmany was not permanently disabled.
B.

Legal Analysis.
Utah's

disability.

no-fault

statute

does

not

define

the

term

However, in Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Company,

592 P.2d 609, 611 (Utah 1979), the court defined disability as
meaning the inability to work.1
met the foregoing definition.

The evidence in this case clearly
Chanhmany testified that she could

not lift the 50 lb. boxes without help by her co-workers.
testimony was supported by her co-worker. (Tr. p. 2 60).

Her

Hence, her

employee transferred her to packaging. (See Tr. pp. 90-91). 2

!

0ther state courts have concluded that injuries comparable to
Chanhmany's can be a permanent disability. E.g. Elliott v. Simon,
385 A.2d 249 (N.J. 1978); see, Johnson v. Phillips, 345 So.2d 1116
(Fla. App. 1477) ("permanent injury").
2

In other words, the employer made a reasonable accommodation
consistent with the Americans With Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C.
1211(9)(A) and (B).
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POINT IV

THE JURY'S INADEQUATE AWARD F O R M E D I C A L EXPENSES
R E S U L T S FROM PREJUDICE
A.

F a c t u a l Background —
rwri

Proceeding B e f o r e t h e Lover Court.

*

jurors

pr e j iicli ced
w h e n t h e ti

t h a t they

were

* I" he i r hands
.

by chiropra * Stahe 1 i , A

showed

. ;

- ,- i .
*

>

.3 opposed treatment
1 -2).
U" eicl or."

Juror
h.i ve

;

their place, it depends on what the problem is. He also hesitated
in answering whether he could base his decision on the evidence.
(Tr. p. 42, Ins. 16-23).

Similarly, Juror Nortstrom said that he

would not go to a chiropractor. (Tr. p. 43, Ins. 23-24).
While both of them pledged that they would base their
verdict on the evidence, an inadequate compensatory award for
medical damages shows that they and the other jurors did not.
Instead, as set forth

in Point I, the jury disregarded the

uncontested evidence that Chanhmany sustained $3,299.09 and awarded
her only $2,001.00 in medical expenses.
B.

Legal Analysis.
An inadequate verdict, may make it appear that the

verdict was given under the influence of prejudice.
Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah 1984).

See Meyer v.

In addition, the

failure to take into account proven facts is prejudice. See Wellman
v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 353; 366 P.2d 701 (1969).

Prejudice may

also be shown when the jury disregards competent evidence. See
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 P. 2d 1078, 1084 (Utah
1985).

Finally,

juror prejudice may be shown by answering

questions on voir dire.

E.g. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533

(Utah 1981)3

3

In Jenkins, a statement by a prospective juror on voir dire
that he would give more weight to the testimony of the witnesses'
status as a doctor, established prejudice or bias and required a
new trial.
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POINT V
THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT CHANHMANY WAS
DISABLED COUPLED WITH THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE
DISABILITY ISSUE TO THE JURY AND SUBSEQUENT DENIAL
OF CHANHMANY'8 MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL EFFECTIVELY
DENIED CHANHMANY HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ON
THIS IMPORTANT FACTUAL ISSUE
Utah's Const, ar t
tri a 1 :! i

: • :i :i II

cases

I, § 1 0 guarantees the right to a jury
International Harvester Credit Corp. v.

Pioneer Tractor and Implement.
Thi.c

important right,

j
t~
Estrada,

tu ^ u .
..

2d 1 1 #

(i MI

xne

>~ extends
j
rt \

- Utah
Ant uuts j.jLynu i
a proper demand.
8).

) .

indamental p a n

*v * rav not bp -i *

c
tried

Inc. , h;f» 1 ,.'<1 i 11*

section 1 0
factual issue

Holland v. Wilson.

In this case, Chanhmany demanded a jury trial. (R. 2-8) .
The issue of whether an individual is permanently disabled is a
factual issue.

Elliott, supra: see Johnson. supra; Lynch v.

Adirondack Transport Lines Inc., 564 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1991); Petrone
v. Thornton, 561 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1990). However, because there was no
dispute that Chanhmany was disabled, see Point III above, the trial
judge concluded that Chanhmany was disabled and the issue was not
presented to the jury.

Only, after the jury awarded less than

$3,000 as compensation for medical expenses, the lower court struck
the general damages award.

To strike the general damages award,

the Court had to change its mind and conclude that Chanhmany was
not permanently disabled.

The trouble with all of that is, that

Chanhmany had a constitutional right to have a this factual issue
determined by a jury. The remedy for the Court's failure to do so,
is to grant a new trial. Holland v. Wilson, supra.
x.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's decision denying Chanhmany a new trial
lacks a reasonable basis. There is no dispute. She is permanently
disabled.

There is no dispute she sustained more than $3,000 in

medical expenses. Two jurors expressed prejudice. In addition, at
the very least, Chanhmany was deprived of her constitutional right
to a jury trial on the disability issue.

26

For each of these

reasons, the Orrtnr ind Judgment

nf tho

1 ovo-*- court should be

reversed and tho ra-.! remanded for a now trial.
DATFD 1 11 l

ft

-A^ i\

1M

1 |Q4.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for-*Plaintif f

EDWARD T, WELLS"
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that 1 *i ( >) 1 i UP \m\ correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLAM'I (< li inliui iny, et a I
al) were mailed, postage prepaid
t

I 11 *

i 1 1 1 1 1 1 I-.I in 1 1 1 1 .

Wendel1 \. Bennett
448 East 400 South, #304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Terry M. Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON k SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City IM M I I in ••?'•)/()

4

i i ii

11 •, 11

„. i\\

this

// ^

I ;•• ,L :: :-t

di i oi Mi^

1994

ADDENDUM

DETERMINATIVE
ORDINANCES

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS,

STATUTES AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT
OBJECTIONS

TO

SPECIAL VERDICT

DEFENDANT

JnYi.'K

l'l.'UST< ill "!

J l lb<..MI''NT

nu

ADDENDUM 1

Sec, ] 0. [ rrii il 1 >y jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors.
In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors
may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
History: Const. 18%.
Cross-References. — Civil actions, right to
jury trial in, U.R.C.P., Rules 38, 39.

31A-22-307. Personal injury protection coverages and benefits.
(1) Personal injury protection coverages and benefits include:
(a) the reasonable value of all expenses for
necessary medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, rehabilitation, including prosthetic devices, ambulance, hospital, and nursing services, not to exceed a total of $3,000 per person;
(b) (i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of
any loss of gross income and loss of earning
capacity per person from inability to work,
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after
the loss, except that this benefit need not be
paid for the first three days of disability, unless the disability continues for longer than
two consecutive weeks after the date of injury; and
(ii) a special damage allowance not exceeding $20 per day for a maximum of 365
days, for services actually rendered or expenses reasonably incurred for services that,
but for the injury, the injured person would
have performed for his household, except
that this benefit need not be paid for the first
three days after the date of injury unless the
person's inability to perform these services
continues for more than two consecutive
weeks;
(c) funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to
exceed a total of $1,500 per person; and
(d) compensation on account of death of a person, payable to his heirs, in the total of $3,000.
(2) (a) To determine the reasonable value of the
medical expenses provided for in Subsection (1)
and under Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e), the commissioner shall conduct a relative value study of
services and accommodations for the diagnosis,
care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state to
assign a unit value and determine the 75th percentile charge for each type of service and accommodation. The study shall be updated every other
year. In conducting the study, the department
may consult or contract with appropriate public
and private medical and health agencies or other
technical experts. The costs and expenses in-

curred in conducting, maintaining, and administering the relative value study shall be funded by
the tax created under Section 59-9-105. Upon
completion of the study, the department shall
prepare and publish a relative value study which
sets forth the unit value and the 75th percentile
charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation.
(b) The reasonable value of any service or accommodation is determined by applying the unit
value and the 75th percentile charge assigned to
the service or accommodation under the relative
value study. If a service or accommodation is not
assigned a unit value or the 75th percentile
charge under the relative value study, the value
of the service or accommodation shall equal the
reasonable cost of the same or similar service or
accommodation in the most populous county of
this state.
(c) This subsection does not preclude the department from adopting a schedule already established or a schedule prepared by persons outside the department, if it meets the requirements
of this subsection.
(d) Every insurer shall report to the Commissioner of Insurance any patterns of overcharging,
excessive treatment, or other improper actions by
a health provider within 30 days after such insurer has knowledge of such pattern.
(e) In disputed cases, a court on its own motion
or on the motion of either party may designate an
impartial medical panel of not more than three
licensed physicians to examine the claimant and
testify on the issue of the reasonable value of the
claimant's medical services or expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in Subsection
(l)(a) and in Subsection 31A-22-309(l)(e) include expenses for any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing.
(4) This section does not prohibit the issuance of
policies of insurance providing coverages greater
than the minimum coverage required under this
chapter nor does it require the segregation of those
minimum coverages from other coverages in the same
policy.
(5) Deductibles are not permitted with respect to
the insurance coverages required under this section.
1991

31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to personal injury protection.
( D A person who has or is required to have direct
benefit coverage under a policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of
action for general damages arising out of personal
injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile
accident, except where the person has sustained one
or more of the following
fa) death,
(b) dismemberment,
(c) permanent disability,
(d) permanent disfigurement, or
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of
$3,000
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this part may only exclude
from this coverage benefits
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured
while occupying another motor vehicle
owned by or furnished for the regular use of
the insured or a resident family member of
the insured and not insured under the policy,
(n) for any injury sustained by any person
while operating the insured motor vehicle
without the express or implied consent of the
insured or while not in lawful possession of
the insured motor vehicle,
(in) to any injured person, if the person's
conduct contributed to his injury
(A) by intentionally causing injury to
himself, or
(B) while committing a felony,
dv) for any injury sustained by any person
arising out of the use of any motor vehicle
while located for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war whether or
not declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition
incident to any of the foregoing, or
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not
limit the exclusions which may be contained in
other types of coverage
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by
(a) any benefits which that person receives or
is entitled to receive as a result of an accident
covered in this code under any workers' compensation or similar statutory plan, and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or
is entitled to receive from the United States or
any of its agencies because he is on active duty in
the military service
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party
under any other policy, including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during
the accident
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section
31A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly basis as ex-

penses are incurred Benefits for anv period are overdue if t h e \ are not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and
amount of expenses incurred during the period If
reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim,
the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received
by the insurer Anv part or all of the remainder of the
claim t h a t is later supported by reasonable proof is
also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof
is received by the insurer If the insurer fails to pav
the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of V/2% per month after the due
date The person entitled to the benefits mav bring an
action in contract to recover the expenses plus the
applicable interest If the insurer is required by the
action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the
insurer is also required to pav a reasonable attorney's
fee to the claimant
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to the following
(a 1 t h a t where the insured under the policy is
or would be held legally liable for the personal
injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under personal injury protection
have been paid by another insurer, including the
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the person who would be held legally
liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable, and
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by
mandatory binding arbitration between the insurers
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regarding a victim's response to patterns of
domestic abuse or violence be considered by the trier
of fact in determining imminence or reasonableness
in accordance with that section, and that the
evidence be considered when useful in understanding
the perceptions or conduct of a witness.

express or implied consent of the insured or while
not in lawful possession of the insured motor
vehicle;
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct
contributed to his injury:
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or
(B) while committing a felony;
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising
out of the use of any motor vehicle while located
for use as a residence or premises;
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not
H. B. No. 15
declared, civil war, insurrection, rebellion or
Passed 2/4/94, Approved 2/16/94
revolution, or to any act or condition incident to
Effective 5/2/94
any of the foregoing; or
Laws of Utah 1994, Chapter 4
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive,
toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of
Motor Vehicle Insurance - Personal
nuclear materials.
Injury Protection
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit
the exclusions which may be contained in other
By John L. Valentine, Kelly C. Atkinson, Steve
types of coverage.
Barth, J. Brent Haymond, Russell A. Cannon,
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person
Frank R. Pignanelli, J. Reese Hunter, Met
under Section 31A-22-307 are reduced by:
Johnson
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is
entitled to receive as a result of an accident covered
An Act relating to the insurance code; in this code under any workers' compensation or
permitting a cause of action for general similar statutory plan; and
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is
damages from personal injuries caused by
an automobile accident in cases of entitled to receive from the United States or any of
permanent impairment; and making its agencies because [he] that person is on active
duty in the military service.
technical corrections.
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party
under any other policy, including those policies
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH complying with this part, primary coverage is given
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
by the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use
during the accident.
AMENDS:
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in
31A-22-309, as last amended by Chapter 230,
Section 31 A-22-307 shall be made on a monthly
Laws of Utah 1992
basis as expenses are incurred.
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are
Be It taMCted by the LegislMttve of the state of Uub:not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 31A-22-309, Utah Code Annotated expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable
1953, as last amended by Chapter 230, Laws of proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if
Utah 1992, is amended to read:
not paid within 30 days after that proof is received
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and
by the insurer. Any part or all of the remainder of
conditions to personal injury protection.
I the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the
benefit coverage under a policy which includes proof is received by the insurer.
personal injury protection may not maintain a cause
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when
of action for general damages arising out of due, these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of
personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an l-l/27t per month after the due date.
automobile accident, except where the person has
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring
sustained one or more of the following:
an action in contract to recover the expenses plus
(a) death;
the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by
(b) dismemberment;
the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest,
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment the insurer is also required to pay a reasonable
based upon objective findings;
attorney's fee to the claimant.
(d) permanent disfigurement; or
(6) Every policy providing personal injury
(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of protection coverage is subject to the following:
$3,000.
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury would be held legally liable for the personal injuries
protection coverage under this part may only sustained by any person to whom benefits required
exclude from this coverage benefits:
under personal injury protection have been paid by
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while another insurer, including the Workers'
occupying another motor vehicle owned by or Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of the
furnished for the regular use of the insured or a person who would be held legally liable shall
resident family member of the insured and not reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not
insured under the policy;
in excess of the amount of damages recoverable;
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while and
operating the insured motor vehicle without the
(b) that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry
of a new
J
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, $ 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial.
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.
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Attorneys for Defendant Bone
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and
through his natural mother and
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually,

)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR ADDITUR
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR A NEW TRIAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D.
BONE,

|
|

Civil No. 910907726PI
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
The motion of the plaintiffs for additur or in the
alternative for a new trial having come before this Court on
October 4, 1993, Edward T. Wells appearing for the plaintiffs and
Wendell E. Bennett and Terry M. Plant appearing for defendants
Preston and Bone, respectively, the Court having considered the
memorandum of the plaintiff and defendant Bone and being otherwise
fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
motion of the plaintiffs for additur or in the alternative for a
new trial is hereby denied, and the Judgment on Special Verdict
entered by this Court on July 29, 1993 will stand.

DATED this

/^-dav of Qefeetees, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

^HONORABLE JOHN fSf. ROKICH
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL, postage prepaid, this "J^^day of
October, 1993, to the following:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Defendant Preston
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

OW^:

TMP:lr}/92-152.53
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HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Bone
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and
through his natural mother and
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually,

JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D.
BONE,

Civil No. 910907726PI
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
The

above-entitled

commencing April

was

tried

before

a

jury

993 and continuing through April 29, 1993 on

tlit* i uHifij] a iLiii'ii ii
A, Preston and Bria:

case

juiti.tit, Khai Chanhmany, versus both Joyce
. Bone,

The clai in of plaintiff

Randy

Chanhmany was bifurcated from the case of Khai Chanhmany just prior
t

-.-:• -

•

-.e "jury, having heard evidence

produced by the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, the Court having received
the Special Verdict on the jury and also having considered the
issue

whether

or

not

1 laintiff

had

met

the

t .hreshold

requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309•( 1) and having made

its Minute Entry on July 1, 1993, based upon the Special Verdict of
the

jury

»ii il I.he Hi 11 rite l i n t i y
1

,

IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

plaintiff Khai Chanhmany was not negligent.

2.

: Etndant Joyce A. Preston was not negligent.

1

/.o defendant Brian D. Bone •> •

negligence was th« *** le proximate cause of x.
the plaintiit hi.
I
CI I a i" 111 ni a n y

negligent f and hi s
Mmaqes ,: 1 a lined bv

nanhmany.

The total damages which have been incurred by Kha i
i i l r' ii \ ;,ll I *: o n s e qii e n c e o f

«i *

t: h = • n e g 1 i g e n c e o f B i: i a i:i 1)

Bone are as follows:
a.

ast medical expenses

b.

--s

101.00

TOTAL
5.

$2,100.00

$2f201.00

Even though the jury in i ts Special verdict found

general damages in favor of the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany in the sum,
of $3 , 000 3: ,
dated

July

. • accordance with the Minute Entry

1 , 1 9 9 3 , \ \\<* Cuiiit

:)f the Court

, p n ' i 1 }\:a I 1 > t i n d r . I h»-jt ... ii • * J I i m l

entitled to general damages in this matter because she failed
meet

the

Annotated
failed
medical
3

threshold

requirements

(

+-' p r o v e
expenses

of
Due

that
.

§

by

-

prove that she had sufferect

Codp

I .c > th< : s f.. a,c I t ,1: lat

s h e h a d iiiel : the
required

31A-22-309(] ) Utah

$3,000.00

1 Jireshol

: •:

Utah Code Annotated

31A-22-

in: f :l:ie:i : til a I : J'laxnL if

^ LI e d I'u

permanent disability i n accordance
_2-

with Utah Code Annotated

', I 1 A - 2 J - J O y | I I M I .

finds that the award made by the
; T,Hi r-.4t;i ve

-

• :- - p e r m a n e n

T h e Court

jury tor general damages was

"i»t f i n d P l a i n t i f f

:

tuither

suffering

from

. urther, the Court specifically finds

that Mie plaintiff failed ~ comply v..

any of the other potential

"threshold" crltei ia iL,.eL

jde Annotated

-309

(195 3, as amended).
Plaintiff Khai Chanhmany :?

therefore, entitled

a judgment aga
$. -TO" ""

".•

amouiiL ui ^ i ?
7,

T

o
f

Lnterest

./. <

amount

: l 40.

^

^ n c :ostt

.x.e

iui. d iotdi judgment ui $2,822.30.
Defendant Joyce A, Preston is entitled to judgment

against the plaintiff Khai Chanhman; - -..*- plaintiff's complaint
o

• .

cosus

from the plaint..: : .,;.. , Chanhmany.
.etermined that all judgment entered herein
will

-

rcordance

with Utah statute, Utah Code Annotated

_

.

^ amended).

DATED this o? 9 day of Jul y, 1993.
BY THE (

/dL—

A - K ^iL^JL

NORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
istrict Court Judge

-3-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hi'n.'hy uiiii. N y th.it

I mai J ^d a 1 i uu and ' n n c t i . o >py oT

the foregoing JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, postage prepaid, this
i-o uae following:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Defendant Preston
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

TMP:lrj/92-152.43
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

°' —
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RANDY CHANHMANY, et al.,
Plaintiff,

]i
>
)

MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A
NEW TRIAL

I
]

livii No. 910907726PI

JOYCE A. PRESTON, et al.,

vs.

)

Defendant.

Jb :

c:h

]

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59, Utah Rules of
Civi 1 Procedure, p] a i i 11:ii f f in« Dv es the Co\ ir t f :)r a1n nid 11 u r nr

111 tin•

alternative for a new txi al on the issue of damages.
This

Motion

is

supported

by

the

Memorandum

filed

herew i t,h.
DATED this

3 o —

day of

. 1993.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that true and com j t ( '-npio1

of tin

foregoing MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL
(Chanhmany v. Preston) were mailed, postage prepaid, t h i s
sj j/(

/

,

J 9 ( J I 11 i i f hie ! 111 J i iw i nq:

Wendell E. Bennett
448 East 400 South, #304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Terry M. Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 5 00
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 8411G-z?/0

4148-040\vah
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A
NEW TRIAL

)

Civil No. 910907726PI

i

Judge John A. Rokicn

RANDY CHANHMANY, et al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOYCE A. PRESTON, et al.,
Defendant.

Plaintiff submits the following Memorandum in support of
her moti < :>i i foi : a n a< Idi ti i:i : or i i 1 tl: ICE a 1 ternative for a new t::i : :i a l

on

the issue of damages.
MATERIAL FACTS
i\ t

t r i a ] , 11: i e

f o ] ] ow i i ig

facts

were

est a b 1 i s h e ci b y

undisputed testimony:
Plaintiff w a s injured in an automobile accident on
i a i i B o n e c o 1 ] I d e ci w :i t:

- *.- r

vehicle.
. Gary Whitley testified as to treatment rendered
for her

$3,299. < 9.

3.

"•-•. Whitley testified the treatment received by Khai

Chanhmany was reasonable and necessary.
4.

No witness testified to there being a smaller amount

as the reasonable and necessary amount of treatment, and there was
no ties"

•*:

received by plaintiff were unnecessary, or that any specific amount
charged was n~* reasonable.
5.

medical

b 1.1.1 s, a n d i t wa s

admitted showing total bills to be $3,299.09.
6.

No evidence was received to contradict this amount

or to show a lesser amount as reasonable
dispute the reasonableness
7.

and necessary

necessity ct .*:,•-

c: :i : to

tern shown therein.

Defenda

plaintiff's bil lings were unreasonable -.. unnecessary.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SPECIAL DAMAGE AWARD IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE
AND THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT AN APPROPRIATE ADDITUR OR, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES
Hnli"
provides,

1

1 i i, 11 |'. i in

I 111

Utcili Ku J eto ul

Civil

pertinent part, as follows:
(a) [A] new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes, ,
(5) Excessive
or
inadequate
damages, appeari ng to have been
2

Procedure

given under the influence or passion
or prejudice.
While granting a new trial is one remedy for inadequate
damages, the Utah Supreme Court has held that implicit within the
authority of the Court to grant a new trial is the power to grant
an additur to the verdict. In Boden v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327
P.2d 826, 828 (1958), the Court stated:
There is implicit within the authority of the
court to grant a new trial on the statutory
ground of "excessive or inadequate damages"
the power to order a new trial conditionally;
that is, to order that a new trial be granted
unless the part adversely affected by the
order agrees to a remittitur or an additur of
the damages to an amount within proper limits
as viewed by the court.
The Court explained that this process of modifying the
verdict to bring it within the evidence is reserved for situations
where the verdict is outside the limits of what appears justifiable
under the evidence to such an extent that the verdict should not be
permitted to stand.

Id. at 829.

In Paul v. Kirkendall. 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, 671
(1953),

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

explained

the

standard

in

determining whether to grant an additur or new trial as follows:
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict
presents a situation that such inadequacy or
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury of
the evidence or the instructions of the Court
as to the law applicable to the case as to
satisfy the court that the verdict was
rendered under such disregard or misappre-

hension of the evidence or influence of
passion or prejudice, then the court may
exercise its discretion in the interest of
justice and grant a new trial.
The Court further clarified this standard in Wellman v.
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah) by stating that an
additur or new trial is warranted where "it seems clear that the
jury has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or
misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence."

Id. at 354.

The plaintiff acknowledges that it is generally the
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages.
Jensen v. Ekins, 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978).

Where, however, the

standards listed above have been satisfied, the trial court can and
should step in and exercise its prerogative to bring the verdict
within the limits of the evidence.

Such is the case here.

This is not a case where the plaintiff is dissatisfied
with the amount of a general verdict and requests an additur. This
is a case where the jury rendered a special verdict.

The damage

award of that special verdict on the issue of special damages is
inconsistent with the evidence on special damages which was before
the jury, and upon which they must base their verdict.
The jury found that defendant Bone was negligent and that
this negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The

4

undisputed

testimony

was

that

the

amount

of

reasonable

and

necessary medical care received by plaintiff was $3,299.09.
In the case of John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City
Corporation, 795 P.2d 678, 683 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah Court of
Appeals held that a jury award below the lowest figure for damages
set forth in the evidence could not be allowed to stand and
reversed

the case and sent it back to the trial court with

instructions to enter judgment for the lowest amount of damages
established by testimony.

In this case, that figure would be the

$3,299.09 for special damages.
When a verdict is supported by competent evidence, the
court usually leaves it as it is.

When, however, there is no

evidence to support an award, the court may take action to conform
the award to the evidence.

See Weber Basin Water Conservancy

District v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958).
An additur is a proper method of treating a situation
where inadequate damages are awarded.

See Bodon v. Suhrmann,

supra.
In the present case, the only evidence on the issue was
that $3,299.09 was the amount spent by plaintiff for medical
expenses for treatment of injuries received in the accident.

Dr.

Whitley testified such amount was reasonable and necessary.

No

testimony was received to the contrary.
5

Therefore, an additur to

bring the special damages to $3,299.09 should be granted.

In the

alternative, a new trial should be granted on this issue because
the jury did not follow the evidence and instructions of the Court.
Instruction Number 29 instructed the jury to award special damages
for "reasonable and necessary expenses for doctors, x-rays, and
other medical services actually incurred by plaintiff."
$3,299.09 was the amount of expense actually incurred by
plaintiff and according to testimony of Dr. Whitley, such was
reasonable and necessary.

There was no contrary evidence.

Failure of the jury to follow the instructions of the
court on the law is sufficient basis for granting a new trial.
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin. 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615
(1966) ; Matter of Acquisition of Property by Eminent Domain, 236
Kan. 417, 690 P.2d 1375 (1984); Cole v. Gerhart. 5 Ariz. App. 24,
423 P.2d 100 (1967); Seooi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683
(1978); Salvail v. Great Northern Rv Co.. 473 P.2d 549 (Mont.
1970); Price v. Sinnot, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837 (1969) affd. 90
Nev. 5, 517 P.2d 1006 (1974).
A new trial is also proper where there is insufficient
evidence to support the jury verdict.

Efco Distributing, Inc. v.

Perrin, supra; Villeaas v. Brvson. 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61
(1972).

6

The whole purpose of a new trial is to correct errors
made at the trial.

In the present case, the jury made obvious

errors in not following the court's instruction on damages and in
failing to award special damages according to the undisputed
evidence.
As the court observed in Efco Distributing, Inc. v.
Perrin, supra:
If is clearly appears that there has been a
miscarriage of justice because the jury has
refused to accept credible, uncontradicted
evidence where there is no rational basis for
rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that
the jury has acted under a misconception of
proven facts, or has misapplied or disregarded
the law, or where it appears that the verdict
was the result of passion or prejudice, it is
both the prerogative and the duty of the court
to set aside the verdict and grant a new
trial.
In the present case, the findings of the jury do not
follow the evidence.

In the event the court does not grant the

additur motion, a new trial should be granted on damages.
CONCLUSION
The jury's answers to the question on special damages is
not justified under the evidence in the case and cannot be allowed
to stand.
The evidence at trial argues for an additur to $3,299.09
to comply with the evidence at trial on special damages; or in the
alternative for a new trial on the damage issue.

DATED this

3cP
JC/

d
ay ofof
day

JW/

\J V I f

1993.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

By:
DWARD T. WELLS

-TLM

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ADDITUR OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL (Chanhmany v. Preston) were mailed,
postage prepaid, this

^)Q -*~ day of

the following:
Wendell E. Bennett
448 East 400 South, #304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Terry M. Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

4148-039\vah

J~U I /

/ 1993 to

FKL8J BSSTBICT S6URT

Third Judicial District

TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Bone
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180]
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

JUL 2 9 1993

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and
through his natural mother and
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually,

JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL
VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs,
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D.
BONE,

Civil No. 910907726PI
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
The

above-entitled

case

was

tried

before

a

jury

commencing April 27, 1993 and continuing through April 29, 1993 on
the complaint of the plaintiff, Khai Chanhmany, versus both Joyce
A. Preston and Brian D. Bone.

The claim of plaintiff Randy

Chanhmany was bifurcated from the case of Khai Chanhmany just prior
to the commencement of trial.

The jury, having heard evidence

produced by the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, the Court having received
the Special Verdict on the jury and also having considered the
issue as to whether or not Plaintiff had met the threshold
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309 (1) and having made

its Minute Entry on July 1, 1993 , based upon the Special Verdict of
the jury and the Minute Entry of the Court,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The plaintiff Khai Chanhmany was not negligent•

2.

The defendant Joyce A. Preston was not negligent.

3.

The defendant Brian D. Bone was negligent, and his

negligence was the sole proximate cause of the damages claimed by
the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany.
4.

The total damages which have been incurred by Khai

Chanhmany as a direct consequence of the negligence of Brian D.
Bone are as follows:
a.

Past medical expenses

b.

Past wage loss

101.00

TOTAL
5.

$2,100.00

$2,201.00

Even though the jury in its Special Verdict found

general damages in favor of the plaintiff Khai Chanhmany in the sum
of $3,000.00, in accordance with the Minute Entry of the Court
dated July 1, 1993, the Court specifically finds that she is not
entitled to general damages in this matter because she failed to
meet

the

threshold

Annotated
failed
medical

requirements

(1953, as amended).

of

§

31A-22-309(1)

Utah

Code

Due to the fact that Plaintiff

to prove that she had met the $3,000.00

threshold

expenses as required by Utah Code Annotated

for

§ 31A-22-

309(1)(e) (1953, as amended) and further that Plaintiff failed to
prove that she had suffered a permanent disability in accordance
-2-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, postage prepaid, this
J^day of July, 1993, to the following:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Defendant Preston
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

TMP:lr^/92-152.43
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ADDENDUM 4

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RANDY CHANHMANY, et al.,
Plaintiff,

OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT
JOYCE PRESTON'S JUDGMENT ON
I SPECIAL VERDICT

|

vs.
|

Civil NO. 910907726PI

JOYCE A. PRESTON, et al.,
I Judge John A. Rokich
Defendant.
Plaintiff Khai Chanhmany, through counsel Edward T.
Wells, hereby objects to Defendant Joyce Preston's Judgment on
Special Verdict as follows:
Plaintiff objects to paragraph 5 on the grounds that
plaintiff does meet the threshold requirements of Utah Code Ann, §
31A-22-309(1)(c) and (e). The undisputed trial testimony was that
plaintiff has a permanent impairment of at least 6.8%.
Plaintiff incurred over $3,000 in medical bills as well.
The jury in its discretion did not award the full amount of the
bills despite the undisputed testimony that the injuries she was
being treated for were related to the accident from which this
lawsuit arose.

Plaintiff also objects to paragraph 7 in that the jury in
its discretion did not attribute any negligence on the part of
Joyce Preston. Brian Bone was found 100% at fault. Therefore, all
costs should be paid by Defendant Brian Bone.
DATED this

/ V

day of May, 1993.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff

EDWARD T. WELLS
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT JOYCE PRESTON'S JUDGMENT ON
SPECIAL

VERDICT

prepaid, this

/f

(Chanhmany

v.

Preston)

mailed,

postage

day of May, 1993 to the following:

Wendell E. Bennett
448 East 400 South, #304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Terry M. Plant
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

c
4148-037\vah

were

TERRY M. PLANT, #2610
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Bone
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 (84180)
P. 0. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RANDY CHANHMANY, a minor, by and
through his natural mother and
guardian, KHAI CHANHMANY, and
KHAI CHANHMANY, individually,

)
j MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
]
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
] OF OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
JOYCE A. PRESTON and BRIAN D.
BONE,

|
|

Civil No. 910907726PI
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
The defendant, Brian D. Bone, submits the following
memorandum of points and authorities in support of his objection to
Plaintiff's judgment on the verdict.
In her

judgment

on the verdict

submitted

to this

defendant on May 12, 1993, a copy of which is attached hereto for
the convenience of the Court, Plaintiff properly sets forth the
answers to the special interrogatories answered by the jury.
Special Interrogatory No. 6 contains the damages portion of the
jury verdict.

In awarding damages, the jury awarded past medical

expense to the plaintiff in the amount of $2,100.00.
dcflnage award was given for $3,000.00.

A general

Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309 sets forth as follows:
(1)

A person who has or is required to have
direct benefit coverage under a policy
which includes Personal Injury Protection
may not maintain a cause of action for
general damages arising out of personal
injuries alleged to have been caused by
an accident, except where the person has
sustained one or more of the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

death;
dismemberment;
permanent disability;
permanent disfigurement; or
medical expenses to a person
$3,000.

in excess of

Due to the fact that the plaintiff has failed to meet any
of the threshold requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309,
in accordance with the language of that statute she is not entitled
to any general damage award.

There are a number of "thresholds"

set forth under § 31A-22-309 which will allow a party to meet the
requirements of the statute. Given the jury's verdict, she did not
meet the medical

expense threshold

and there was no evidence

presented to the jury regarding any of the remaining thresholds.
The

plaintiff

obviously

is

not

dead

and

has

sustained

no

dismemberment or permanent disfigurement of any kind as a result of
the accident.

As to the permanent disability threshold, while

there was evidence discussed at the trial concerning "impairment",
there was no evidence whatsoever offered concerning disability and
particularly no medical testimony or other appropriate testimony to
establish that the plaintiff had sustained permanent disability.
As the Court is aware, there is a distinct difference between
-2-

impairment

and disability, and in order for the plaintiff to

sustain her burden of meeting the threshold requirements, he must
establish that she is not only impaired, but disabled in some way.
There was virtually no evidence offered in this trial regarding
disability.

Further, given the low amount of general damages

awarded, the Court can and should rule as a matter of law that the
jury found no permanent injury of any kind.

However, even if the

Court does believe there may be an issue concerning a permanent
impairment, since the plaintiff failed to put on any evidence of a
"disability" and further given the amount of the jury verdict for
general damages, the Court should rule as a matter of law that
there was no permanent disability established and therefore should
likewise rule that the plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold
requirements of § 31A-22-309.
As a result of the foregoing, the defendant Brian Bone
prays that the award of $3,000.00 for general damages be stricken
and that the plaintiff recover only her special damages, which
would include past medical expense and past wage loss, but be given
no award for general damages.
DATED this

^ ^

day of May, 1993.
HANS<S3, EPPERSON & SMITH

T^RYyk. JPLftNT
AttorneV^for Defendant Bone
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT, postage prepaid,
this /(/fcLav of May, 1993, to the following:
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Wendell E. Bennett
Attorney for Defendant Preston
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

J-^
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